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GRACE V. WHITAKER: ADVANCING REFUGEE RIGHTS
BEYOND THE CREDIBLE FEAR INTERVIEW
BY ELISA VARI AND RICHARD

A.

BOSWELL

◄

In December 2018, federal judge Emmett Sullivan
of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
issued a decision with great significance for asylumseekers at the credible fear interview stage and, as
argued in this paper, in asylum proceedings generally.
While the case, Grace v. Whitaker, is currently on
appeal, its mandate has not been stayed, and both the
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS")
and the Executive Office for Immigration Review
("EOIR") have issued revised guidelines to officers
and immigration judges on how the decision is to be
implemented. 1 In Grace, Judge Sullivan,reviewed the
far-reaching case of Matter of A-B-, which had been
decided by Attorney General Sessions in June 2018,
as well as the USCIS Policy Memorandum issued the
following month instructing officers on its implement at
the credible fear interview ("CFI") stage.2
With Matter of A-8-, Sessions sought to curtail
protections for asylum-seekers fleeing their country
due to domestic or gang-based violence by overruling
Matter of A-R-C-G-, which recognized gender-based
violence as a valid ground for persecution, and by
essentially reinterpreting U.S. asylum law in a way that,

as Judge Sullivan wrote, is inconsistent with existing
precedents and Congress' intent in passing the 1980
Refugee Act.3
This paper will briefly discuss the significance of
Matter of A-8- and the resulting USCIS memorandum .
It will then explain Grace v. Whitaker and how the
decision is of great importance not only for credible
fear ("CF") proceedings, but also for asylum applications in general, as the language used by Judge Sullivan,
while not binding in other contexts, can still be relied on
by practitioners as persuasive authority.
Background on Matter of A-Bin the summer of 2018, Attorney General Jeff
Sessions used his "certification" powers and assumed
the role of decision maker in Matter 'of A-B-, thus exercising a power that is not commonly uscd.4 When the
decision was first issued in June, many advocates saw it
as severely limiting protections for survivors of
"private" violence, making it virtually impossible for
those fleeing domestic abuse or gangs to succeed in
their claims for asylum. 5
In his decision, Sessions reversed Matter of A-R-CG-, sharply criticizing the Board of Immigration
Appeals' ("BIA") failure to engage in a meaningful

1

Grace v. Whitaker,344 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2018);
Grace v. Whitaker - EOIR Guidance re Grace Injunction,
December 19, 2018, https://www,aclu.org/lcgal-documcnt/
grace-v-whitakcr-eoir-guidance-re-grace-injunction,https://
pcnna.cdC5B9-R272;Grace v. Whitaker- USCIS Guidance
Re Grace Injunction, December 19, 2018, https:l/www.
aclu.org/legal-document/gracc-v-whitakcr-uscis-guidance-regracc>injunction,https://~cc/LMK6-86GA
2

Matter of A-B·, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 320 (2018); see
also Center for Gender and Refugee Srudies, CGRS Practice
Advisory: Matter of A-B-(July 6, 2018); U.S. Citizenshipand
Immigration Services, Policy Memorandum PM-602-0162:
Guidance for Processing Reasonable Fear, Credible Fear,
Asylum, and Refugee Claims in Accordance with Matter of
A-8- [hereinafter "USCIS Policy Memo") (July 11, 2018),
available at https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USClS/

Laws/Memoranda/2018/2018-06-18-PM-602-0162-USCISMcmorandum-Mattcr-of-A-B.pdf, https://pcrma.cc/8ZDH8X55; 23 Bender's lmmigr.Bull. 872 (App. E)(Aug. 1, 2018).

3

344 F. Supp. 3d at 126;see also Matter of A-R-C-G-,
26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014).
4
8 CF.R. § 1003.l(h)(J);seea/soPressRelease,Centerfor
Genderand RefugeeStudies,CGRS FilesSuit SeekingInfonnation on Sessions' Intervention in Maller of A-B- (March 7,
2019), https://cgrs.uchastings.cdu/news/cgrs-files-suit-seckinginformation-sessions%E2 %80%99-intcrvcntion-mnttcr-b,
https://perma.ccNYB2-9EGP.

s Jeff Sessions is Hijacking Immigration Law, Slate.com
(June 13, 2018), https://slate.com/ncws-and-politics/2018/
06/in-matter-of-a-b-jeff-sessions-hijacked-immigration-lawby-abusing-a-rarely-used-provision.html, https://perma.cc/
9AKB-SDA4; Sessions Says Domestic and Gang Violence
Are Nol Groundsfor A.l)'lum, NY Times(J unc 11,2018),https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/us/politics/sessions-domcsticviolence-asylum.html,
https:l/pcnna.cc/52LV-3DTZ.

analysis of the case before it.6 Specifically,in A-R-C-Gthc BJA had recognized "married women in Guatemala
who are unable to leave their relationship" as a particular social group ("PSG") by giving, according to
Sessions, "insufficient deference to the factual findings
of the immigration judge. " 7 Sessions reiterated the
general requirements to establish cognizability of and
membership in a PSG, namely immutability, particularity, and socinl distinction, but then outlined blanket
rules ns to how these are to be satisfiedwhen the persecutor is a private actor.8
Sessions' statement that "in practice [claims based
on violence inflicted by private actors] are unlikely to
satisfy the statutory grounds for proving group persecution that the government is unable or unwilling to
address" was particularly problematic.9 The Attorney
Gcncml, in fact, seemed to assume that if persecution
is not inflicted by a governmental body or individual
connected to the state, rarely could it count as persecution, even though, as Grace discusses and as explained
infra, numerousjudicial precedents support the cognizability of PSGs when the government is not involved.
Sessions stressed that, when the government is not the
persecutor, the applicant must show that the government "condorted" the persecution or demonstrated a
"complete helplessness" in providing protection. 10
This was criticizedas a distortion of and higher standard
thnn the ordinarily applied "unable or unwilling to
protect" standard.11
Another problematic element of the decision was
Sessions' take on the "one central reason" standard
for the nexus requirement of asylum applications. In
6

Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320.

7

26 I. & N. Dec. at 389; Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec.
at 320.
~ Mauer of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320.
9

Id. at 320.

fact, Sessions seemed to suggest that just because the
persecutingprivate actor has a pre-existing relationship
with the asylum-seeker, as is clearly the case with
domestic-violence based claims, an applicant for
asylum cannot prove that membership in a particular
social group constitutes "one central reason" for persecution, because the persecutor would have ulterior
motives to hann her.12
Further, Matter of A-B- stressed the importance of
avoiding circular PSGs, that is PSGs defined by the
harm inflicted on the applicant.As Sessions explained,
the PSG articulated by Ms. A-B-, "El Salvadoran
women who arc unable to leave their domestic relationships where they have children in common," was
impennissibly circular because it relied on the "unable
to leave" element 13 That element,accordingto Sessions,
is part of the persecution inflicted on the member and
makes the PSG dependenton the hann and thereforenot
cognizable.14
Lastly, and more problematically, Sessions provided a series of additional requirements throughout
the decision, stating, for example, that all PSGs the
applicant is relying on need to be delineated at the
inception of the case and may not be added on appeal;
he also stated that when only a few individuals are
persecuting the applicant, relocation is likely more
reasonable.15 Sessions also stressed that, in exercising
discretion, adjudicators should take into consideration,
inter alia, whetherthe applicantengaged in the "circumvention of orderly refugee procedures."16 Finally, the
Attorney General stated that an adverse credibility
findingmay resulteven when there are only a few discrepancies and omissionsin the applicant's claim.17
Sessions' sweeping statements on Matter of A-B-,
however, were, as discussed below, soon challenged,
and advocates indicated that, in any case, much of
what was in the decision should be treated as dictum
since for the most part it discussedhypotheticalscenarios
rather than Ms. A-B-'s specific case.'8

w Id. at 337 (quoting Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955,958
(7th Cir. 2000)).
11

Immigrant Legal Resoun:e Center, Matter of A-BConslderalians 4, https://www.ilrc.org/sitcs/default/files/
rcsources/matter_a_b_considerations-20180927
.pdf [MILRC
PracticeAdvisory"],https://perma.cc/9BEM-NCR3;
American
ImmigrationLawyers Association,AILA Policy Brief USCIS
Guidanceon Matterof A-B- BlocksPl'OteclionsforVulnerable
Asylum Seekers and Refagees (July 23, 2018), https://www.
ai\a.org/Filc/DownloadEmbeddedFile/76742,https://perma.
cc/3XDW-H66K;Exclusive: how asylum officers are being
told 111impleme11tSessions' new rules, Vo,c.com(June 19,
20 I8), https://www.vo,c.com/poticy-and-politics/2018/6/19/
l 74 76662/asylum-border-sessions, https://perma.cc/X86XNK2G.

12

Mauer of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 338-39.

13

Id. at 343.

14

Id. at 334-36

15

Id. at 344-45; see also ILRC Practice Advisory,supra
note 11.
16

Matter of A-B-. 271. & N. Dec.at 345 n.12.

11

Id. at 342.

18

ILRC Practice Advisory, supra note 11, at 3.

USCIS Policy Memo of July 2018

Despite the disputed value of Sessions' ruling,
USCIS rapidly issued a policy memorandum in July
2018 directing its officers on the implementation of
the decision in the context of CFis and reasonable
fear interviews at the expedited removal stage. 19
The memo instructed officers to adopt the standards
outlined in Matter of A-B- and to abandon reliance on
Matter of A-R-C-G-. It also directed the application
of a "condoned or demonstrated complete helplessness" standard for nongovemment pcrsccution. 20
Specifically, it explained that showing that a country
has issues in addressing crime "cannot, by itself, establish eligibility for asylum." 21
The Policy Memo also suggested, in accordance
with Matter of A-B-, that tenns such as "'married,'
'women,' and 'unable to leave the relationship' are
unlikely to be sufficiently particular" for purposes of
establishing a PSG.22 USCIS explained to its officers
that when the applicant is vulnerable to generalized
crime, groups based on such vulnerability "are not a
subdivision of the society, but instead arc typical of the
society as a whole. " 23 It concluded, therefore, that
members of groups victimized by private activity will
likely fail to meet the particularity required to establish
a cognizable PSG.
USCIS then discussed the requirement that a PSG
is defined independently from the harm asserted1by the
applicant. Relying heavily on Sessions' language,
USCIS instructed its officers that a group such as
"married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave
their relationship" is impennissibly circular because the
applicant's inability to leave is created by the hann
alleged.24
USCIS also took Matter of A-B- and fully adopted
its view that, generally, "claims based on membership
in a putative particular social group defined by the
members' vulnerability to harm of domestic violence
or gang violence committed by non-government

actors will not establish the basis for asylum. " 25 It
also reiterated Sessions' assumptions that, if there is a
pre-existing relationship between the persecutor and the
applicant, then the applicant's membership in a PSG will
often fail to meet the "one central reason" slandard for
nexus, and that internal relocation is likely more reasonable where the persecutor is not the govemment.26
Finally, the Policy Memo instructed USCIS agents
to weigh an applicant's illegal entry as a ground for
a negative exercise of discretion, or if the applicant
"demonstrated ulterior motives for the illegal entry
that arc inconsistent with a valid asylum claim that
the applicant wished to present to U.S. authorities." 27
Both the USCIS Memo and Matter of A-B-,
however, were largely conscribed by the Grace decision discussed below.
Grace v. Wl,itaker

In August 20 I 8, the American Civil Liberties Union
and the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies at the
University of California, Hastings challenged the
validity of Sessions' decision and the resulting USCIS
Policy Memo in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia on behalf of twelve nam~d plaintiffs. 2 s
The plaintiffs, who had received a negative credible
fear interviews and were ordered removed, alleged,
inter alia, that Matter of A-B- and the USCIS Policy
Memo impermissibly heightened and distorted the relatively low standards that are typical of CFls . For the
most part, Judge Sullivan agreed with the plaintiffs'
main argument and issued an order, narrowing the
Altorney General's decision and signaling to the administration that the powers of the Attorney General to
change the law are not unfettered.
Plaintiffs' Complaint
The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive
relief to prevent implementat~on of aspects of both
2

'

26

27
19

See usersPolicy Memo,supra note 2.

20

UsersPolicy Memo,supra note 2,at 2.

21

Id. at 6.

22

Id. at 3.

23

Id. at 4 (relying on Maller of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec.

at 335).
24

Id. at 5.

28

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 8.

Becausethe case involveda challengeto the application of expeditedremovalthe statute limitsreviewto an action
filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,
the only court that can entertainjurisdictionover "a systemic
challengeto the legalityof a 'written policy directive, written
policy directiveguideline,or writtenprocedure issued by or
under the authorityof the AttorneyGeneralto implement' the
expeditedremovalprocess." Grace v. Whitaker,344 f . Supp.
at 108; see 8 U.S.C. §1252(e)(3)(A)
.

the AttorneyGeneral's decision in Matter of A-B- and
the resultingUSCISPolicy Memo writtenin July 2018.
They argued that the decision as well as the Memo
effectively toughened the CFI process, even though
Congress intended for such proceedings to entail a
lower standard, that is "a possibility ... that the alien
could establish eligibilityfor asylum." 29
First, the decision and Memo allegedly had made
blanket-rulestatementscreatingan "unlawfulpresumption" againstthe cognizabilityof PSGsbased on private
persccution.30 This, the plaintiffs argued, violated the
requirement that asylum claims be analyzed case by
case and was a departure from existing precedentsand
prior policy. Second, they allegedly changed the standards for asylumby requiringthat applicantsshow that
the foreign government "condoned or demonstrated
complete helplessness" and by making the nexus standard more diffitult to meet for members of PSGs. The
"condoned or demonstrated complete helplessness"
standard, the plaintiffs argued, is inconsistentwith the
text and context of the Refugee Act and Congress'
intent to confonn to internationalnonns. Furthennore,
precedents provide that an applicant can meet the
"unable or unwilling" standard even when she cannot
show that her governmentcondonedpersecutionor was
helpless to provide protectionagainstnongovernmental
persccuton;.31
In challengingMatter of A-B- 's nexus requirement,
the plaintiffsargued that the INA providesthat a persecutor could have mixed motives in inflicting harm on
the applicant,and thus a preexistingrelationshipshould
not defeat a claim. Moreover, they maintained that
Sessions' finding that including "unable to leave" in
the PSG fonnulation renders the group dependent on
the harm alleged and thus makes it impermissibly
circular was mistaken. Inability to leave is in fact the
result of several factors aside from the harm, including
cultural and societal norms that the persecutor may
believe in and circumstancesthat affect applicants in
their own countries and make women subordinate to
men in the eyes of society.32

unprecedented, and unlawful. "[D]efining and establishing membershipin a particular social group is one
of the most complex and difficult questions in asylum
law," the plaintiffs argued, and it cannot be expected
that applicantswill be able to articulatesuch a nuanced
aspect of their claim as soon as they arrive at the border,
especially at a "truncated, nonadversarial" stage such
as that of the CFI. 33
In altering and tougheningrequirementsfor asylum
seekersfleeingdomesticabuse and gang-basedviolence,
in short,the plaintiffscontendedthatMatter of A-B- and
the USCIS Policy Memo put protections for asylum
seekers in general at serious risk and deprived the
plaintiffs and those similarly situated of meaningful
avenues to seek protectioneven if their asylwn claims
were meritorious.34
The Decision
The district court found that the policies introduced
by .Matter of A-B- and USCIS' Policy Memo deviated

from prior policies and were therefore an arbitraryand
capricious interpretation of the law such that they
violated the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")
and the INA.35 The court held that while "Congress
has not spoken directly on the precise question of
whether victims of domestic or gang-relatedpersecution fall into the particularsocial group category... the
legislativehistory [of the 1980RefugeeAct] does make
clear that Congress intended to bring United States
refugee law into confonnance with the [Protocol]." 36
Specifically,the court stressed that the 1980 Refugee
Act was enacted in accordancewith the "historicpolicy
(?fthe United States to respond to the urgent needs of
persons subject to persecutionin their homelands[and]
it is the policy of the United States to encourage all
nations to provide assistanceand resettlementopportunities to refugees to the fullest extent possible."' 37
Therefore, even though ultimately the court found the
statute to be ambiguous, it stressed the importanceof
looking not only at the Protocol but also al the U.N.
High Commissionerfor Refugees' ("UNHCR") Handbook, which "codifiedthe UnitedNations' interpretation

In addition, the directives imposed by Matter of
A-B- and the USCIS Policy Memo required applicants
to articulate PSGs at the credible fear stage, a requirement the plaintiffs alleged was wholly unreasonable,

J'J

30

Pis.' Compl. ,r4 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(bXl)(B)(v)).

Id. at ,r55.

33

Id. at ,r 62. (internal quotation marks omitted).

34

Id. at 1/80-83.

35

Grace, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 120.

36

Id. at 123-24(internal quotation marks omitted).

37

·" Id. at ~- 58.
32 lei. at , . 60.

Id. at 124 (citing Maharaj v. Gonzales,450 F.3d961,
983 (9th Cir. 2006) (O'Scannlain, J. concurring in part and
citingRefugeeActof 1980,Pub.L. No. 96--212,
94Stat 102)),

-

-

-

2..i lk1Hkr"~ 11111111'.21,1111111
Bulk1111

---

---

---
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(lS(J

of the tenn 'particular social group' . . . construing the
tenn expansively. " 38

supported by agency precedent," the court concluded
that they violated immigration law.44

The district court concluded that Matter of A-Bwas not "the product of reasoned decisionmaking"
and its blanket-rule statements were arbitracy and capricious interpretations of the INA, because they are
contrary to precedent and at odds with Congress'
intent to make the CFI screening a tower standard. 39
Specifically, the court held that "[a] general rule that
effectively bars the claims based on certain categories
of persecutors (i.e. domestic abusers or gang members)
or claims related to certain kinds of violence is inconsistent with Congress' intent to bring United States
refugee law into conformance with the [P]rolocol. " 40
The court concluded that, because the Attorney General
had interpreted "PSG" in a way that resulted in a general
and overbroad rule, he was operating outside of a permissible interpretation of the law. The Attorney General's
statement that gang-based violence could rarely, if ever,
be cognizable directly conflicted with Congress' in~ent
as well as the BIA's and circuit precedents indicating
that the cognizability of a PSG is to be determined
case by case.41

Judge Sullivan then held that the government's
interpretation of persecution was inconsistent with
lhc statute. 4s Specifically, the standard imposed that an applicant show that the government condoned
or displayed complete helplessness - is a much more
stringent standard than the "unwilling or unable"
one and would mean that "no asylum applicant who
received assistance from the government, regardless
of how ineffective that assistance was, could meet the
persecution requirement when the persecutor is a nongovernment actor." 46 Accordingly, the government's
interpretation of the term "persecution" to require that
a foreign government condoned the violence or was
completely helpless in providing protection to an applicant was erroneous.

Further, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that
Matter of A-B- "impermissibly heightened the standard
at the credible fear stage. " 42 The provisions of the INA
relative to CFI proceedings, in fact, point to Congress'
intent that such proceedings be nonadversarial and
require only that the applicant show a significant possibility (a one in ten chance) ofpersccution. 43 That means
that a CFI requires only a fraction of what a full asylum
screening usually requires. Because Sessions' overbroad
statements were "neither adequately explained nor

38

Id. nt 124.

39

Id. at 125.

40

Id. at 126 (internal quotations omitted).

As to nexus, the court agreed with the government
that its interpretation of the nexus requirement was
reasonable. 47 According to the court, the government
relied on the "one central reason" standard and merely
stated that hann based on purely personal disputes will
not satisfy the nexus requirement. 48 The court thus held
that the government's interpretation is not inconsistent
with the INA. At the same time Judge /)ullivan stressed
that, "although the nexus standard forecloses cases in
which purely personal disputes are the impetus for the
persecution, it does not preclude a positive credible
fear determination simply because there is a personal
relationship between the persecutor and the victim, so
long as the one central reason for the persecution is a
protected ground. " 49
The court then addressed whether the government's
application of the rule against circularity in the USCIS
Policy Memo was in compliance with the Refugee
Act. It held that it was not, as "it ensures that women
unable to leave their ~elationship will always be
circular. " 50 This, Sullivan explained , seemed like a
misinterpretation of that rule as well as "faulty assumptions about the analysis in Matter of A-B-" with no

41

MatterofM-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227,251 (BlA
2014); Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 21 l, 233 (BlA
1985); see also Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1084
(9th Cir. 2014) ("To detennine whcthcrn group is a particular
social group for the purposes of an asylum claim, the agency
must make a case-by-case dctennin ation as to whether the
group is recognized by the particular society in question.");
Serrano-Alberto v. Att'y Gen., 859 F.3d 208, 212 n.2 (3d Cir.
2017) (same); Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir.
2016) (same); Paiz-Morales v. Lynch, 795 F.3d 238, 245 (1st
Cir . 2015) (same) .

44

Id.

45

It/. at 127-28.

46

Id. at 129.

47

Id. at 130-31.

48

Id. at 131.
Id.

42

344 F, Supp . 3d at 126.

49

43

Id. at 127.

so Id. at 133.

reasoned explanation for such a changc. 51 Because
USCIS's interpretation went "well-beyond" what was
expressed in Matter of A-B- and had no basis in law, the
court found it lo be arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to
immigration law.
The court further held that neither Matter of A-Bnor the Policy Memo directed officers to exercise
discretion at credible fear proceedings, but it did find
tha~the Policy Memo impennissibly required applicants
to delineate specific PSGs at that stage in a way that is
an nrbitrary and capricious interpretation of the law.52
It also held that the Policy Memo's direction to USCIS
officers to ignore relevant circuit law and look at only
the law of the circuit where the CFI takes place violated
BrandX,53 a Supreme Court case that established that
where "an agency is not entitled to deference or if the
agency's interpretation is unreasonable, a court's prior
decision interpreting the same statutory provision
54
controls. " Accordingly, the court found USCIS' direction to be arbitrary and capricious and in violation of
the statute.55
As a result of its findings, the D.C. District Court
issued a permanent injunction stopping the implementation of the policies delineated in Matter of A-B- and in
the USCIS Policy Memo and ordered new interviews
for the plaintiffs. 56 In complying with Grace USCIS
and EOIR thus issued new guidance for CF proceedings. USCIS directed its officers to evaluate each claim
on its merits as no general rule for domestic violence
and gang-related violence exists, to use the "unable
or unwilling" standard and not the "condoned" or
"contplcle bciplessness" formulation, to accept that
PSGs that include "inability to leave" may be cognizable and not circular and no general rule against them
exists. It directed them not to require applicants to
delineate or fonnulate PSGs and not to disregard
contrary circuit law and or limit the analysis to circuit
law where the applicant is located during the CFI. s7
Similarly, EOIR pointed out to immigration judges
conducting credible fear review hearings that they arc

enjoined from applying certain aspects of Matter of
A-B- and interpretations by USCIS of that case.58
Grace's Application Beyond the Credible Fear Stage
Many of the court's conclusions in Grace could be
applied to asylum claims more generally. Several
portions of the decision, even those geared primarily
towards the CFI process, can be persuasive authority
for asylum applications in other contexts, thanks to
the court's statutory interpretation and reliance on
administrative law principles.
Judge Sullivan reiterated extensively how the
Refugee Act was enacted in order to bring U.S. law
into compliance with international law, and that not
only the Protocol, but also the UNHCR Handbook's
expansive interpretation of PSGs and of persecution
can be relied on lo interpret U.S. law in matters of
59
asylum. In fact, "the language in the Act should be
read consistently with the United Nations ' interpretation
of the refugee standards," and "[t]he clear legislative
intent to comply with the Protocol and Congress' election to not change or add qualifications to the U.N.'s
definition of 'refugee' demonstrates that Congress
intended to adopt the U.N. 's interpretation of the word
'refugee. "' 60 The court also stressed that "the Refugee
Act was enacted to further the historic policy of the
United States to respond to the urgent needs of persons
subject to persecution in their homelands [and] it is the
policy of the United States to encourage all nations to
provide assistance and resettlement opportunities to refugees to the fullest extent possible." 61
These statements lend strong support for a more
' expansive view of how asylum applications should
be considered, given that international refugee law
as applied by UNHCR is, in many respects, more
generous than U.S. asylum law. 62 Reminding the
government that the Refugee Act was drafted with international standards of protection in mind, therefore, is an

58

~1

Id.

jl

Id. at 134-35.

$l NationalCable & Telecommunications
Associationv.
Bl'llndX Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005).

'

_

4

344 F. Supp. 3d at 137.

$'

Id. at 137-38.

541

Id. at 146.

57

note I.

See USCIS Grace v. Whitaker Guidance, supra

See EOIRGrace v. WhitakerGuidance,supra note 1.

59

344 F. Supp. 3d at 123-24.

60

Id. at 124.

61

Id. (internal quotationmarks omitted).

62

See e.g., Joan Fitzpatrick,The International Dimension of U.S. Refugee Law, 15 BerkeleyJ. lnt'I Law. I, 25
(1997) ("Even where the internationalstandard is clear and
peremptory ... , embodied in a ratifiedtreaty,and specifically
implementedin domestic legislation for the express purpose
of fulfillinginternationalobligations,both administratorsand
courts resist giving internationallaw its full effect").

important success for advancing more progressive
asylum and refugee law policies domestically that
reflect those standards.
Other courts have rightfully relied on UNHCR
guidelines. 63 The recognition that countries are to
protect individuals fleeing persecution was an important development in human rights law, and the U.S.
committed itself to providing that protection when it
signed the Protocol. When the administration enforces
policies that so clearly go against the spirit of not only
the Refugee Act but also the Protocol and other international human rights commitments, such policies
ought to be challenged because there is a strong basis
to reject them.
Another important and far-reaching

holding in

Grace is the court's reminder lo the government that
it cannot prevent entire groups or categories of applicants from presenting colorable claims for asylum. This
is true not only at the credible-fear stage, but also during
asylum interviews or hearings. No such rule can ' exist,
because it would be contrary to the statute, especially
when looked at in light of international standards,
which understand PSGs to be construed broadly. 64
Moreover, that PSGs have lo be evaluated by adjudicators on a case-by-case basis is a firmly established
principle, and Gracelends further support for this propa.
sition and should be used to continue to advance PSGs
based on domestic-abuse and gang-related violcnce. 65
The court's reliance on the UNHCR Handbook is
also significant to explain that the term "persecution" is
clearly defined and was never meant lo require the
"condone or show complete helplessness'' standard:
the UNHCR Handbook stated that persecution
included "serious discriminatory or other offensive acts .. . committed by the local populace ...
if they are knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or if the authorities refuse, or prove unable,
to offer effective protection." See UNHCR
Handbook 165 (emphasis added). It was clear

at the time that the Act was passed by Congress
that the "unwilling or unable" standard did
not require a showing that the government
"condoned" persecution or was "completely
helpless" to prevent it. " 66
Lastly, the court's statements regarding the rule against
circularity and the nexus requirement rely on BIA and
circuit precedents applicable to asylum requests in
67
general.
Therefore, while this case was only a challenge to
credible fear determinations in the expedited removal
process, the legal conclusions, if upheld, can support
how future courts limit Matter of A-B-.

Conclusion
While Grace is on appeal, the injunction has not
been, and it signifies a big blow to the sweeping
statements made by the former Attorney General and
USCIS. To be sure, even before Grace was decided,
it was reported that between June 12, 2018, and
November 30, 2018, there were at least twenty-nine
grants for domestic violence claims and at least seventeen grants for fear-of-gang claims in asylum offices
across the country, and at least forty-one grants of
asylum or withholding for domestic violence claims
and at least thirty-five grants of asylum or withholding
for fear-of-gang claims at the immigration court level,
indicating that the view that Matter of A-B- does not
preclude domestic violence and gang-related claims has
strong support among adjudicators evcrywherc .68

Grace thus represents an important tool to push
back on the restrictions imposed by the government
on asylum applications for victims of nongovernmental
persecution. While geared towards credible fear interviews and hearings, the decision's language lends itself

66

344 F. Supp. 3d at 128.

67

63
See, e.g., the seminal Supreme Court opinion in INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n,22 (the UNHCR
Handbook provides "significant guidance in construing the
Protocol, to which Congress sought to confonn [and) has
been widely considered useful in giving content to the obligations that the protocol establishes.") .
64

Grace, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 126 ("Credible fear determinations, like requests for asylum in general , must be
resolved based on the particular facts and circumstances of
each case.").
6
'

Sec the cases cited supra note 41.

Id. at 13 I, 133 ("courts have routinely found the
nexus requirement satisfied when a personal relationship
exists-including cases in which persecutors had a close relationship with the victim," and "there cannot be a general rule
when it comes to detennining whether a group is distinct
because •it is possible that under certain circumstances, the
society would make such a distinction and consider the shared
past experience to be a basis for distinction within that
society."') (citing Mauer of M-E-V-G-, 261. & N. Dec. at 242).
68
American Immigration Lawyers Association, Matter
of A-B•: Case Updates, Current Trends, a11dSuggested
Strategies, AILA Doc. 19020731 (Feb. 2, 2019), available
al https://www .a.ila.org/infonet/matter.af-a-b-case-updatcscurrcnt-trcnds, https://pennacc/K2TK-F5RP.

to being used at all levels of asylum proceedings more
generally. Between its strong reliance on international
standards and its reiteration that no blanket rule can be
established to prevent applications involving privately
sponsored violence from being granted, Grace will be a
powerful instrument for advocates to advance their
clients' cases and for adjudicators lo address them
fairly. Of equal importance is the decision's signal to
the current administration that the government may not
deviate from long-standing precedents and the existing
law without facing the courts' exacting scrutiny. No
matterhow badly the administration wants to curtail
protections for noncitizens on all fronts, there arc laws
in place and a judicial system that will not tolerate
arbitrary and unsupported applications ofunfair policies
againstvulnerable groups.
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